Has Europe's center-right started relying on the far right?

In German politics, the rule is supposed to be simple: no cooperation with the far right. The "Brandmauer" — the firewall against the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party — is treated as a democratic red line, at least at a national level. But in Brussels and Strasbourg, a larger and more unsettling question is emerging: Does Europe's center-right still believe in isolating the far right, or is it increasingly relying on it to secure majorities and pass legislation when convenient?

That question has become louder after reports that lawmakers from the European People's Party (EPP), the dominant force on the European center-right, coordinated with far-right groups ahead of key votes on migration policy, including proposals for so-called "return hubs", deportation centers outside the EU.

The significance of the reports is not just that the far right voted with the center right, but that there may have been prior contact, agreement on wording and efforts to assemble a joint majority. The real story may go beyond one controversial vote. It hinges on whether the EPP is developing a new governing habit: Working with the pro-European center when possible and turning to the far right when useful.

A broader shift

Nicolai von Ondarza, an expert on EU institutions at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), argues that this is not just a one-off case. It signals a structural change in how the Parliament works. "The EU is moving in the direction of something like a minority government in the European Parliament," he said to DW. In his view, the EPP is increasingly choosing between two possible majorities: The traditional pro-European coalition with Socialists and Liberals, and, in a growing number of cases, a majority with parties to its right.

That does not mean the Parliament has fully realigned. Ondarza stresses that more than 80% of decisions are still carried by the mainstream pro-European majority. But, he says, the important shift is that the right-wing alternative is no longer taboo. "It is still the exception, but an exception that is occurring more frequently."

Sophia Russack, a Research Fellow at CEPS, a Brussels think-tank, goes further. She says the latest reports merely confirm what many in Parliament already suspected. "This is the new normal," she said to DW in an interview.

Russack highlights a telling discrepancy in media reactions between Germany and the rest of Europe. In her reading, the German uproar says a great deal about a country where the firewall still carries political force, in comparison to the mood elsewhere in Europe, where cooperation with the far right is no longer that shocking.

Just a coincidence?

For both analysts, there is a key distinction between accidental overlap and active cooperation. The EPP has long defended itself by saying it cannot prevent far-right parties from voting the same way as it does. But Ondarza says there is growing evidence of something more deliberate going on behind the scenes, including coordinated wording and an effort to forge majorities.

Russack underscores this complicity. "You cannot prevent them from voting your way," she said. "But of course you can write amendments in a way that they will support you."

That matters because it changes the political meaning of the alliance. In the European parliament, there is no government-opposition binary as in many national parliaments. Majorities are often assembled file by file. But if legislation is drafted with far-right backing in mind, or if parliamentary actors negotiate with those parties in advance, then the relationship is no longer incidental. It becomes strategic.

Will the center-right's reputation take a hit?

That strategy may strengthen the EPP in the short term, as it can chose its legislative partners on the left and the right. Ondarza says the 2024 European elections clearly changed the parliamentary arithmetic and gave the center-right more room to maneuver. But he also warns that this comes at a cost.

One risk is practical: the more often the EPP turns right, the less willing Socialists and Liberals may be to cooperate on the many dossiers where it still needs them. The result could be a more unstable and unpredictable EU.

The second risk is political: If the center-right increasingly legitimizes the far right as a partner, it may end up empowering forces that do not merely want to influence policy but reshape the EU's political character. The deeper threat, he argues, is that anti-liberal and anti-pluralist actors gain more power to redefine what Europe stands for.

He also issued a warning that has already been voiced by several member states: mainstream conservatives may think they are containing the far right by borrowing their support, but they may instead be strengthening a rival that could one day overtake them. In blunt terms: The conservatives risk sidelining themselves.

Growing legitimacy

Russack makes a similar point from inside the Parliament's institutional logic. The far right has long had seats, speaking time and publicity in Brussels and Strasbourg. What is changing now, she argues, is that it is increasingly able to shape outcomes, thus boosting its legitimacy. "It is one thing to be voted into parliament. It's another thing to shape decisions." 

She gives the example of migration,where positions and terms that once seemed politically unthinkable have been adopted by the center-right. But the issue goes beyond migration. Once the far right becomes a long-term source of support for the center-right, it gains leverage, both experts agree. Such a development allows it to influence language, priorities and the boundaries of European policy.

Edited by: Jess Smee