The collapse of 'world order' as an opportunity for Asia?

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine on the European Union's eastern flank, the United States' disregard and contempt for the international order under President Donald Trump, and the allegations that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza have shocked many Europeans.

The world order that took shape after World War II appears to have come to an end. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026: "This order, as imperfect as it was even in its best days, no longer exists in that form." 

However, in Asia, political observers are often surprised at the consternation of European leaders. During the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual Asian security conference held in Singapore, former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan told DW that "Europe thought the jungle had been tamed for good. And then it got a shock."

"Competition and conflict are fundamental characteristics of international relations. These enduring, harsh truths were obscured for a brief period — perhaps about 20 years from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the outbreak of the global financial crisis. This was an extraordinary phase in world history," he added.

The US as we knew it is not coming back

Marc Saxer, Asia-Pacific head of Germany's Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, told DW that European and Asian worldviews are shaped by different historical experiences. Under the protective umbrella of United States, Europe was able to dream of a liberal world order. For Asia, that was unthinkable.

Saxer considers efforts to maintain a liberal world order to have failed, and he believes that "a return by the US to the role it played until the 2010s is impossible for structural reasons."

The political analyst said the unipolar era is definitely over, as the US has overextended itself strategically with conflict zones in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific.

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), told DW that the US under Trump is now attempting to "establish a hegemonic world of great powers, a kind of global directorate along with Russia and China," amounting to spheres of influence controlled by great powers.

As a result, international law and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are being undermined by the United States, China and Russia (each for its own reasons and with its own intentions).

According to Saxer, who has published a book under the same title, the result is a "wolf world," meaning a world "in which the law of the strongest triumphs over the strength of the law."

Middle powers push back

Naturally, most other countries have no interest in such a world. But what counter-trends are emerging?

Kleine-Brockhoff identifies three specific reactions, each of which depends on a country's geographic location and strategic environment.

Japan, which lies in proximity to the rising power of China and has few like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific region, has no choice but to try to deepen its cooperation with the US.

Europe, which forms a geographical unit and is politically intertwined, is focusing on "strengthening itself economically and militarily," according to Kleine-Brockhoff. In doing so, it is trying to keep the US on board for as long as possible during the transition phase in order to ultimately stand on its own two feet.

The third model — a kind of counter-alliance of the middle powers — was articulated by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in his highly acclaimed speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January.

"The old order will not return. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy. But from this rupture, we can build something better, stronger and more just. That is the task of the middle powers," he said.

Saxer said that it is important to note how non-Western countries are now playing a role in determining the future of global order.

"What makes this historic turning point so special is that, for the first time in centuries, non-Western powers are playing a decisive role in shaping the next world order." Unlike in the past, "order will no longer mean Westernization," he added.

What could a new global order look like?

To thrive in this world, Saxer highlights several aspects that add to Canadian leader Carney's "tasks" for middle powers. This includes cooperation not in the form of "alliances" but as "middle-power partnerships" in order to prevent the formation of any blocs.

"Given limited capacities, we cannot rely solely on coalitions of like-minded democracies to address global challenges. Partnerships in the middle must bring together all solution-oriented states, regardless of their internal political systems," Saxer said.

This pragmatic approach moves beyond values-based politics and the search for like-minded partners. Instead, there is cooperation in areas where interests align, which can then be paused where interests diverge.

Of course, this is always done while upholding certain non-negotiable principles, such as human rights.

To achieve this vision of a new global order, Saxer envisions a new version of the Cold War-era "Helsinki Declaration," which primarily addressed security issues in Europe and could be summed up as "universalism without interference."

In the early 1970s, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union — with the participation of European NATO member states and Warsaw Pact countries — agreed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to a voluntary commitment that did not have the status of an international treaty.

According to Saxer, this approach is once again relevant today.

Kleine-Brockhoff is sceptical about the stability of such an arrangement, especially since, unlike in the past, there are forces of global order that are currently diminished.

"Every system needs enforcement agencies and a minimum level of rules and compliance with those rules," he said. The fluid notion of stakeholders who cooperate in areas such as climate policy but work against one another in security policy ultimately remains volatile, he added.

On Carney's worldview, Kleine-Brockhoff argues that the middle powers are too different and have too divergent interests.

"I see the opposing forces, but not the connection between them," he said.

Bad times for common solutions

As a result, current developments are making it more difficult to preserve global public welfare. Mitigating climate change, managing global health risks such as pandemics and securing peace are becoming increasingly difficult.

Kleine-Brockhoff fears the dawn of an era of "endless free-riding." Instead of working together to address global challenges, individual actors will increasingly seek their own advantage.

To prevent precisely this, Saxer sees no alternative but collaboration among stakeholders who are willing to cooperate pragmatically.

In his view, the "transformative realism" he outlines offers the best opportunity to integrate various visions of order following the end of the liberal order, in order to address specific global challenges without reverting to the formation of blocs.

This article has been translated from German